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Fair Housing Laws and Brokers' Defamation Suits: 
The New York Experience 
The New York Law Against Discrimination/ originally enacted 
in 1945 to eliminate discrimination in employment because of race, 
creed, color, or national origin,2 has been steadily broadened to 
encompass discrimination in such areas as public accommodations 
and private housing. The law was amended in 19613 and 19634 to 
enable the State Commission for Human Rights to prevent. dis-
crimination by either the owner or the real estate broker in the 
selling, renting, or leasing of any housing accommodation or com-
mercial space. 6 Despite the apparently broad protection established 
by the sweeping language of the statute,6 real estate brokers have 
discovered a novel response that could render these fair housing 
provisions impotent in their practical application. 
The typical pattern of this response begins when a member of 
a minority group files a written complaint with the Commission 
alleging that a real estate broker's unlawful discrimination has 
hampered the complainant's attempt to purchase or rent property.7 
The complainant is often supported in his efforts by a fair housing 
group seeking to implement integration in the area. The accused 
broker retaliates by instituting a defamation suit against the com-
plainant and fair housing group, seeking damages as high as one 
million dollars and alleging that the complaint has injured his 
professional status and reputation and has greatly impaired the value 
of his business.8 The complainant's normal reaction is to file a second 
I. N.Y. ExEcUTIVE LAw §§ 290·301. 
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 118. 
3. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 414. 
4. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 481. 
5. There are a few minor exceptions from the coverage of the provisions. N.Y. 
ExEcunvE LAw §§ 292, 296. Transactions involving land are now within the scope 
of the prohibition. N.Y. ExEcunw LAw § 296(5). 
6. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw § 296(5)(a): "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice 
for the owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other person having 
the right to sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to be con-
structed, or any agent or employee thereof: (I) To refuse to sell, rent, lease or otherwise 
to deny to or withhold from any person or group of persons such a housing accom-
modation because of the race, creed, color or national origin of such person or persons. 
(2) To discriminate against any person because of his race, creed, color or national 
origin in the terms, conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease of any such 
housing accommodation or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection 
therewith. • •• " 
7. For the procedure of the Commission, see N.Y. ExECUTIVE LAw § 297. 
8. At least three defamation suits have been instituted in this setting. In Sweeting 
v. Cristy Realty Co., the complaint was filed on December 24, 1963, Case No. 
CH-10479-64, with the defamation suit being brought in the Supreme Court of Nassau 
County under Index No. 2940-1964. Letter From Murray A. Miller, Attorney for 
Defendants, to Michigan Law Review, Oct. 22, 1965; Letter From Leonard Brunner, 
Attorney for State Commission for Human Rights, to Michigan Law Review, Sept. I, 
1965. In Santos v. Desgray, the complaint was filed on March 23, 1965, Case No. 
CH-11560-65, and the defamation suit was instituted in the Supreme Court of Westches-
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complaint with the Commission, charging the broker with a violation 
of that portion of the statute which states that it shall be an unlawful 
discriminatory practice to "retaliate or discriminate" against any 
person who has filed a complaint.0 The Commission has dismissed 
all such second complaints for lack of jurisdiction, construing the 
statute as merely prohibiting retaliation by the usual means of 
unlawful discrimination in housing and employment but not as 
forbidding any other means of retaliatory action, such as a civil 
suit.10 In effect this interpretation merely adds the desire to retaliate 
to those other motivations declared to be an illegal basis for per-
forming or failing to perform certain acts in employment and hous-
ing transactions. However, the disjunctive language of the statute 
would seem to indicate that "retaliate" was intended to mean some-
thing other than "discriminate," and that both are unlawful dis-
criminatory pract_ices. Thus, the Commission's interpretation appears 
to impose a restriction that is not apparent on the face of the statute. 
The Commission advances two principal arguments supporting 
its construction of the statute.11 First, it argues that a defamation 
suit sounding in libel is properly determinable by a court of law 
rather than an administrative tribunal. Since the Commission is 
not bound by the strict rules of evidence prevailing in a court of 
law or equity,12 cannot grant a jury trial, and lacks the power to 
award the broker damages were he to win, it lacks the necessary 
procedures to provide a trial for the defamation action. However, if 
the unjustified filing of a defamation suit were considered to be 
within the scope of the retaliation provision, the Commission could 
observe the same statutory procedure in handling the retaliation 
complaint that it follows with other complaints and could even award 
compensatory damages to the complainant injured by the defamation 
suit.13 Therefore, the Commission's argument leaves completely un-
ter County. Letter From Leonard Brunner, Attorney for State Commission for Human 
Rights, to Michigan Law Review, Oct. 18, 1965. In Jackson v. Mentone Realty Co,, 
the complaint was filed with the New York City Commission on Human Rights after 
an attempt to purchase a house in Queens. Letter From Jacob Wittner, Chief of In-
vestigations Division, City of New York Commission on Human Rights, to Michigan 
Law Review, Oct. 25, 1965. 
9. "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any 
activity to which this section applies to retaliate or discriminate against any person 
because he has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because he has 
filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article," N.Y. 
EXECUTIVE LAW § 296(7). 
10. Commission order dismissing retaliation complaint in Sweeting v. Cristy Realty 
Co., CH-10479-64 (N.Y. Commission on Human Rights, 1964), as set forth in Letter 
From Leonard Brunner, Attorney for the State Commission for Human Rights, to the 
Michigan Law Review, Sept. 1, 1965. 
11. See generally ibid. For a third argument advanced by the Commission, sec note 
16 infra. 
12. N.Y. EXEcuTIVE LAW § 297(2)(b). 
13. N.Y. EXEcuTIVE LAw § 297(2)(c). 
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answered the question whether it can find the institution of such a 
suit to be retaliatory, and thus an unlawful discriminatory practice 
which it is empowered by statute to prevent. 
As an additional reason for its restrictive interpretation of the 
statute, the Commission states that even if it did have jurisdiction 
and did find that the broker was retaliating within the meaning of 
the Law Against Discrimination, it would not have the power to 
enjoin the broker from continuing to prosecute the civil action. This 
argument, however, fails to recognize that if a defamation suit were 
treated as an unlawful discriminatory practice under the retaliation 
provision, the Commission would then have the authority to halt 
the discriminatory practice by means of a cease-and-desist order, 
which would be subject to court enforcement if necessary.14 Further-
more, it would seem that the complainant could make a motion be-
fore the court hearing the defamation suit requesting that court 
to stay its own proceeding until the Commission had decided 
whether the defamation suit was properly motivated.15 Thus, the 
Commission's arguments leave unanswered the primary question 
whether the retaliation provision empowers the Commission to 
prevent brokers from intimidating complainants by means of un-
justified civil suits.16 
Despite the apparent weaknesses in its position, the Commission 
might find some support in the legislative history of the legislative 
provision. It appears that retaliation by means of a civil suit was not 
considered in the original enactment of the Law Against Discrimi-
nation, which was limited to the area of employment and only 
prohibited an employer or labor organization from discharging, 
expelling or otherwise discriminating against an employee for having 
filed a complaint.17 Thus, it might be argued that the enactment of 
the present retaliation provision18 in 1963 was intended only to 
extend this same limited protection to housing and other areas in 
which discrimination is now prohibited by state law.19 Under this 
14. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw §§ 297-98. 
15. See note 47 infra and accompanying text. 
16. The Commission also supports its lack of jurisdiction argument by claiming 
that it would be maldng a factual determination in a matter already presented to a 
court of law if it were to consider the complainant's contention that the defamation 
suit was being used by the broker as a means of retaliation. It may be forcefully argued, 
however, that the Commission's determinations as to the truth of the allegations in 
the original complaint are binding upon the court in any event. See notes 43-49 infra 
and accompanying text. Moreover, in the hearing on the complaint of retaliation, the 
Commission is directly concerned only with the broker's motivation in bringing the 
defamation suit. This issue is of only tangential interest to the court, which is directly 
concerned only with the allegedly defamatory content of the complaint. Thus, in the 
retaliation hearing the Com~ission would be required to make few, if any, factual 
determinations on matters also being determined by the court. 
17. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. ll8 (now N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw §§ 296(l)d, (3•a)c), 
18. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 480. 
19. In proposing the retaliation provision in his Annual Message to the legislature 
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view, the only acts envisioned as falling within the new retaliation 
provision would be the discriminatory practices specifically covered 
by other sections of the Law Against Discrimination. On the other 
hand, the addition of the word "retaliate" in the present provision20 
seems to indicate that a broader scope was contemplated and that a 
remedy was intended for methods of "retaliation" more novel 
than the traditional types of discriminatory practices. 
Although no defamation suit against a complainant before the 
Commission has ever been brought to trial, and any that did go 
to trial would probably lose on the merits, such suits retain their 
usefulness as a formidable weapon in defeating the purpose of the 
fair housing laws. The real significance of these suits lies in the 
financial and psychological impact on the complainants and fair 
housing groups of even the mere threat of filing such a suit. The 
prospect of being compelled to defend a million-dollar suit may 
effectively deter an aggrieved party from reporting the discriminatory 
practices of a broker to the Commission. Furthermore, the threat of 
the defamation suit improves the broker's bargaining position before 
the Commission in its proceedings concerning the original complaint 
of discrimination.21 The broker may even use the defamation suit 
to nullify a Commission order to sell the property, by obtaining an 
agreement from the complainant to abandon his rights secured by 
on Jan. 9, 1963, Governor Rockefeller stated: "I recommend that complainants and 
witnesses in cases before the State Commission for Human Rights be given the same 
protection against retaliation in all fields in which discrimination is now prohibited 
by State law as is now afforded in employment discrimination cases." 1963 N.Y. LEGIS• 
LATIVE ANNUAL 430. In the Governor's memorandum on bills approved, he stated: 
"Those who violate State law by discriminating against a person because of race, creed, 
color or national origin should not be allowed to discriminate against other persons 
who lawfully try to stop them." Id. at 452. 
20. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. 
21. Following its normal statutory procedure, the Commission conducts an investi-
gation to determine whether there is "probable cause" to believe the original allegation 
of discrimination against the complainant in his attempt to purchase property. If 
probable cause is found, an investigating commissioner holds a conciliation conference 
with the broker and attempts to persuade him to end his discriminatory practices, If 
the conciliation procedure proves futile, a formal public hearing can follow in which 
the broker may agree to drop the defamation suit, as was done in the Cristy Realty 
case, see note 8 supra, and a Commission order can be issued requiring him to sell 
or rent the property to the complainant and to cease and desist from any further 
discrimination. However, the vast majority of cases are usually settled: less than one 
per cent of those cases where probable cause is found ever result in a hearing. Letter 
From F. William Guma, Deputy Secretary of State, to Professor Robert J. Hanis, 
University of Michigan Law School, April 30, 1965, on file with the Michigan Law 
Review. The statute governing the Commission's procedure is N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW 
§ 297. For a discussion of the procedures of various civil rights commissions in the 
United States, see Note, 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 526 (1961). An ordinance which granted 
powers of conciliation and persuasion to a municipal civil rights agency without de-
lineating specific standards for conciliation has recently been invalidated by the Ohio 
Supreme Court. See Porter v. City of Oberlin, 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1965), 
criticized in 64 MICH. L. R.Ev. 710 (1966). 
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the Commission order and to look elsewhere for housing, in return 
for the broker's discontinuance of his libel suit. 
There are at least three possible civil proceedings available to 
complainants that might be used to preyent or neutralize these 
broker's defamation suits. The first of these is a judicial review of 
the Commission's interpretation of the retaliation provision. Sec-
tion 298 of the Law Against Discrimination gives the New York Su-
preme Courts the power to enforce, modify or set aside in whole or 
in part a Commission order.22 Since the statute does not deal 
specifically with the institution of a civil suit as a discriminatory 
practice, the complainants may have difficulty persuading the re-
viewing court that a defamation suit falls within the scope of the 
retaliation provision. However, the court might be persuaded to 
read the word "retaliate" more broadly than has the Commi~sion, 
since section 300 of the Law Against Discrimination directs that the 
provisions of the law are to be construed liberally.28 On the other 
hand, the court might well be reluctant to uphold a power in the 
Commission to prevent direct access to the courts by the broker, 
regardless of his motive in bringing suit against the complainant. 
Thus, there is no clear indication of how broadly the reviewing 
court would interpret the retaliation provision. 
The second possible approach available to the complainant is to 
contest and defeat the broker's defamation suit on its merits. One 
valid defense could be established by showing that the original 
complaint of discrimination filed with the Commission was priv-
ileged. If a communication is deemed to be of such social importance 
as to require complete freedom of expression without fear of 
prosecution, as in a judicial hearing, the privilege is absolute.24 On 
the other hand, if the interest the defendant seeks to vindicate is of 
less social importance, as in some administrative proceedings, the · 
22. Since N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw § 298 provides only for the review of a Commission 
order, a determination not in the form of an order but with conclusive effect is review-
able only under N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW §§ 7801-03, which has a narrower scope of 
review. On the grounds that the dismissal of a complaint is not an "order," it has 
been held that the dismissal was not reviewable under § 298, although it could still 
be reviewed by an art. 78 proceeding. American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 9 N.Y.2d 
223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961); Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 
N.E.2d 882, 173 N.Y.5.2d 597 (1958). However, since recent amendments provide that 
the dismissal of a complaint shall now be in the form of an order, the obstacle to a 
review under N.Y. EXEcuTIVE LAW § 298 has been removed. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965 
(Metcalf-Baker Law), ch. 851, § 7. 
23. "The provisions of this article shall be construed liberally for the accomplish-
ment of the purposes thereof." N.Y. ExEcUTIVE LAw § 300. 
24. E.g., Seltzer v. Fields, 20 App. Div. 2d 60, 244 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1963), afj'd, 14 
N.Y.2d 624, 198 N.E.2d 368, 249 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1964); Rager v. Lefkowitz, 20 App. Div. 
2d 867, 249 N.Y.S.2d 486. (1964); Marson v. Darrow, 8 App. Div. 2d 207, 187 N.Y.S.2d 
611 (1959). Once the existence of an apsolute privilege is established, the defendant 
is entitled to a summary judgment. Kurat v. County of Nassau, 47 Misc. 2d 783, 264 
N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
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privilege is only a qualified immunity from prosecution which may 
be defeated by showing that the allegedly defamatory communica-
tion was made with malice.25 The absolute privilege granted com-
munications made in the course of a judicial proceeding has been 
extended to communications connected with the judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings of an administrative body.26 It is at least argu-
able from previous case authority in New York that the Commission 
has a sufficient amount of traditional judicial power27 to justify 
bringing its proceedings under the umbrella of this absolute priv-
ilege.28 Having the power to award compensatory damages20 and to 
issue cease-and-desist orders enforceable by the courts,30 the Com-
mission has much broader judicial powers than those administrative 
agencies before which complaints and other proceedings have been 
denied an absolute privilege.31 Indeed, the courts have often referred 
to the Commission as a quasi-judicial body.82 
25. E.g., Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515 (1922); Ellish v. Goldman, 11'1 
N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See also PROSSER, ToRTS 795-800, 805 (3d ed. 1964). 
26. The following cases have found the communication to the administrative body 
to be absolutely privileged: Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945) (complaint 
to N.Y. Industrial Commission); Loudin v. Mohawk Airlines, Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 926, 255 
N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (hearing before Civil Aeronautics Board); Coyne v. O'Con• 
nor, 204 Misc. 465, 121 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (letter to N.Y. Industrial Com-
mission); Brown v. Central Sav. Bank, 64 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (landlord's 
application to Office of Price Administration for eviction certificate absolutely privileged 
on grounds it was part of law suit ultimately instituted); Alagna v. New York &: Cuba 
Mail S.S. Co., 155 Misc. 796,279 N.Y.S. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (complaint to Federal Radio 
Commission); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1956). 
27. The power of an administrative agency to conduct hearings, to subpoena and 
examine witnesses, to subpoena documents, to rule on the admissibility of evidence, to 
make full and conclusive judgments or orders, and generally to observe procedures similar 
to those of the state courts have been referred to as factors supporting the conclusion 
that the administrative body was exercising enough judicial functions for application 
of the absolute privilege. See cases cited note 26 supra. But cf. cases cited note 31 infra. 
It has been suggested, however, that these factors are merely a statement of a con-
clusion reached and are not the reasons for that conclusion. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1296, 
1299 &: n.8 (1956). In considering the possible application of the absolute privilege 
to complaints filed with the State Commission for Human Rights, it would seem 
relevant that the Commission is dependent on complainants to report violations of the 
law, and that the threat of a defamation suit may prevent a potential complainant 
from reporting such violations. On the other hand, the extent to which the real estate 
broker might be harmed by a malicious complainant during the interval between the 
filing of the complaint and the time when its malicious nature is revealed also appears 
relevant. 
28. See cases cited note 26 supra. 
29. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 297(2)(c). 
30. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAw § 297. 
31. The following cases have held the communication to be entitled to a qualified 
privilege only: Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 341 (1918) (petition to 
governor for pardon); Leganowicz v. Rone, 240 App. Div. 731, 265 N.Y.S. 703 (1933) 
(hearing before division of licenses may have qualified privilege); Ellish v. Goldman,, 
117 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (hearing before Zoning Board of Appeals): Longo v, 
Tauriello, 201 Misc. 35, 107 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (application to Temporary 
State Housing and Rent Commission); Roberts v. Pratt, 174 Misc. 585, 21 N,Y.S.2d 
545 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (complaint before bar association of illegal practice of law). 
32. Lake Placid Club, Inc. v. Abrams, 6 App. Div. 2d 469, 473, 179 N.Y.S.2d 487, 
492 (1958); Marrano Constr. Co. v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 45 Misc. 2d 1081, 
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If the complainant is unable to persuade the court that his com-
plaint was protected by an absolute privilege, he would clearly be 
entitled to a qualified privilege, since the Commission is an adminis-
trative agency.83 The case for a qualified, rather than an absolute, 
privilege is buttressed by the Commission's status as an arm of the 
police power of the state,34 since complaints to the police or district 
attorney are entitled only to a qualified privilege.85 The qualified 
privilege may be defeated, however, by proof that the complainant 
acted without a bona fide belief in the truthfulness of the complaint 
of discrimination or acted maliciously for the purpose of injuring 
the real estate broker rather than protecting his own interest.86 The 
ability of the broker to prove improper motivation of course depends 
upon the particular situation. If the complainant had a bona fide 
desire to purchase property, it would probably be difficult to defeat 
the qualified privilege. In one recent case, 87 a white person had 
negotiated with a broker for the purchase of a house and then re-
vealed that he was not a bona fide applicant but was representing 
a Negro purchaser. When -the broker subsequently refused to sell 
the house to the Negro, the Commission ordered the broker to cease 
and desist from his discriminatory practices. Although the reviewing 
court described the Negro's attempt to purchase property in this 
manner as "offensive to [its] concept of fair play,"88 it upheld the 
Commission order based on the evidence of discrimination thus ob-
tained, stating that many charges of discrimination could never be 
sustained without such a procedure.89 On the other hand, if the 
complainant was merely testing the practices of the broker and was 
neither interested in purchasing the property nor injured by the 
alleged discrimination,40 it is possible that a jury could find that the 
259 N.Y.S.2d 4, 10 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 
142 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1955). See also Holland v. Edwards, 282 App. Div. 353, 122 
N.Y.S.2d 721 (1953). 
33. See cases cited note 31 supra. 
34. N.Y. EXECUTIVE I.Aw § 290 states that the Law Against Discrimination shall be 
deemed an exercise of the police power of the state. 
35. E.g., David J. Hodder &: Son, Inc. v. Pennetto, 32 Misc. 2d 764, 223 N.Y.S.2d 685 
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Campbell v. Cunningham Nat. Gas Corp., 164 Misc. 1, 298 N.Y.S. 200 
(Sup. Ct. 1937). 
36. See Teichner v. Bellan, 7 App. Div. 2d 247, 181 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1959). See also 
Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515 (1922); Galore v. Powell-Savory Corp., 21 
App. Div. 2d 877, 251 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1964) (false accusation of discrimination made 
against union held libelous per se); Clarence P. Davis, Inc. v. Dun &: Bradstreet, Inc., 
9 App. Div. 2d 796, 192 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1959). The evidence of malice is insufficient if 
based only on surmise, conjecture or suspicion. Bank for Sav. v. Relim Constr. Co., 
285 N.Y. 708, 34 N.E.2d 485 (1941). 
37. Kindt v. State ·comm'n for Human Rights, 44 Misc. 2d 896, 254 N.Y.S.2d 933 
(Sup. Ct. 1964), afj'd, 16 N.Y.2d 1001, 265 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1965). 
38. Id. at 898, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 936. 
39. Ibid. 
40. A recently enacted Ohio statute prevents the Ohio Civil Rights Commission 
from even considering a complaint based on information obtained by those testing 
the broker's practices without a bona fide desire to purchase property. Omo REv. CoDE 
IDIN. § 4112.05 (Page Current Material 1965). ' 
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complaint was motivated by malice toward the broker.41 However, 
when the evidence clearly shows that the complainant had no actual 
malice toward the broker but was merely testing the broker's com-
pliance with the law, it would seem that the judge should prevent 
the jury from finding malice.42 · . 
Even if the real estate broker is successful in defeating the 
qualified privilege by proving malice, his recovery is by no means 
assured. It is well established in a majority of states, including 
New York, that the defendant in a defamation suit may avoid 
liability by showing that the allegedly libelous communication was 
true.43 In this regard, a strong argument might be made that a deter-
mination by the Commission that the allegations of discrimination 
in the complaint are true is binding upon the court in the defamation 
suit.44 At the time the defamation suit is instituted, the validity of 
the complaint of discrimination is already an issue pending before 
the Commission. Since the court cannot try the defamation suit 
without examining the truth or falsity of the factual allegations of 
the complaint, any court action would involve elements of the same 
issues to be dealt with in the administration proceeding. Under the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a court may not 
adjudicate an issue which is being determined in a proceeding 
properly before an administrative tribunal.45 Thus, while the com-
41. In one recent hearing, the Secretary of State suspended the licenses of four 
salesmen because of their discriminatory practices but dismissed the complaint against 
a fifth salesman on the grounds that there was a "preconceived plan by the Negro 
witnesses to create contentions of discriminatory practices by him." Yonkers Herald 
Statesman, Oct. 7, 1965, p. 1. 
42. When the defendant has established that his remarks are entitled to a qualified 
privilege, the court will grant a summary judgment if there is insufficient evidence of 
malice to warrant submitting that issue to the jury. Chiapinelli-Marx, Inc. v. Pacitto, 
46 Misc. 2d 611, 260 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
43. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.Y. 488, 495-96, 90 N.E. 1117, 1120 (1910): 
Sondak v. Dun &: Bradstreet, Inc., 39 Misc. 2d 13, 239 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Ten 
states have changed this rule with statutes which require that the publication must 
have been made without malice in order for truth to be a defense. See PROSSER, TORTS 
824-25 (3d ed. 1964); 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 547 (1961). The majority rule has been criticized 
on the ground that it awards a needless immunity to malicious slander. See 16 MINN. 
L. REv. 43 (1931); 35 VA. L. REv. 425 (1949). 
44. An analogy may be drawn to the rule in New York and several other states 
that the order of an examining magistrate who finds there is probable cause and binds 
the defendant over for trial is prima facie evidence in a subsequent malicious prosecu-
tion suit. Since the plaintiff bringing the malicious prosecution action must sustain 
the burden of proving that the proceeding was initiated by the defendant without 
probable cause, the action will be dismissed unless the plaintiff can show the magis-
trate's order was obtained by fraud, perjury, or undue influence. Gallucci v. Milavic, 
100 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958); Graham v. Buffalo Gen. Laundries Corp., 261 N.Y. 165, 184 
N.E. 746 (1933); Horowitz v. Goldberg, 124 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1953). In many other 
states, the magistrate's order is only considered as "some evidence" that there was 
probable cause. See, e.g., Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, Inc., 41 Del. 330, 81 
A.2d 283 (1941); Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1164 (1959). 
45. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Norton, 304 N.Y. 522, 109 N.E.2d 705. (1952); 
Matter of Amigone, 47 Misc. 2d 809, 263 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 1965): Hutchins v. 
McGoldrick, 200 .Misc. 964, 108 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Liebman v. Van Denburg, 
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plaint of discrimination is pending, the Commission has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine its validity.46 To avoid by-passing the 
Commission's finding concerning the validity of the complaint, and 
to prevent the litigation of issues already raised in the proceeding 
before the Commission, it would appear that the defamation suit 
must be stayed until the Commission has concluded its investiga-
tion.47 Furthermore, a Commission finding that the complaint 
alleged an actual incident of discrimination would apparently be 
protected from collateral attack in the defamation suit. Although 
the validity of an administrative determination may be challenged 
by direct review, the administrative finding is res judicata in any 
subsequent collateral judicial or administrative proceeding.48 Thus, 
where the Comµiission has found the allegations of discrimination 
to be valid, the truth of the complaint would be a valid defense to 
a subsequent defamatiqn action by the broker.49 
A third civil deterrent to the filing of defamation suits by brokers 
in this setting might be an action for abuse of process.50 If the broker 
is using the defamation suit for the immediate purpose for which it 
was intended-recovery of damages for injury to reputation-an 
action for abuse of process will of course fail. Furthermore, the mere 
existence of ulterior or vindictive motives, such as a desire to retaliate 
against the complainant, will not support the action.51 Thus, it would 
168 Misc. 155, 6 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1938). The Commission proceeding does not 
come under any of the exceptions to the exhaustion rule, such as allowing immediate 
application to the courts in order to ,prevent irreparable harm. Romanisky v. Siglon 
Realty Corp., 122 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
46. Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 21 App. Div. 2d 92, 248 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1964); Holland v. 
Edwards, 282 App. Div. 353, 122 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1953); Redd v. Zier, 229 N.Y.S.2d 582 
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 622, 144 N.Y.S.2d 
747 (Sup. Ct. 1955), affd, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 142 N.E.2d 186, 162 N.Y.S.2d I (1957). 
47. See N.Y. CIV. PRAG. I.Aw § 2201; 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 526, 573-74 (1961). 
48. See Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958); 
Golden v. Joseph, 307 N.Y. 62, 120 N.E.2d 162 (1954); Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 
312, US N.E.2d 452 (1954); Levy v. ll65 Park Ave. Corp., 305 N.Y. 607, Ill N.E.2d 
731 (1953); Infante v. Donohue, 42 Misc. 727, 249 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct. 1964); DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 18.01, .10 (1959). 
49. In the three complaints that have been attacked by defamation suits, the 
Commission bas found that the allegations of discrimination were supported by the 
facts. See note 8 supra. 
50. While the similar action for malicious ,prosecution could be used in some states, 
such a proceeding is not available in New York and many other states where the action 
can be brought for the malicious prosecution of a criminal suit but not for a civil 
suit resulting in a money judgment. See Rappaport v. Rappaport, 44 Misc. 2d 523, 254 
N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Even in those states allowing the action based on any 
civil suit, its potential viability in the present context seems remote. When the original 
suit has been terminated without regard to its merits as a result of an agreement or 
settlement between the parties, the prerequisite that the prosecution complained of 
shall have terminated in favor of the party bringing ·the malicious prosecution suit and 
shall have actually injured him is missing. See Levy's Store, Inc. v. Endicott-Johnson 
Corp., 272 N.Y. 155, 5 N.E.2d 74 (1936); Pelella v. Pelella, 13 Misc. 2d 260, 176 N.Y.S.2d 
862 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (applying Georgia law). 
51. See, e.g., Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 7 N.E.2d 268 (1937) (seeking to have 
relative declared incompetent in order to gain control of his money held not an abuse 
928 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64 
appear that in order for the complainant to succeed he would be 
required to show that the broker's primary motive was to use the 
defamation action as a lever in his negotiations before the Commis-
sion or as a weapon in coercing the complainant. 
Even if the complainant is able to make the requisite showing, 
however, he may as a practical matter be pressured into discontinuing 
his abuse-of-process action. After the defamation suit has had the 
desired economic and psychological impact upon the complainant, 
the broker may offer to drop the suit in return for the complainant's 
discontinuance of his abuse-of-process suit. Such an offer would 
present the complainant with the dubious choice of agreeing to 
terminate all civil suits by an exchange of general releases52 or facing 
a million dollar defamation suit in order to bring his action for 
abuse of process. It would seem likely that the complainant would in 
most cases yield to the pressure exerted by even the remote chance 
that the defamation suit might succeed, and would agree to the 
exchange of releases. 
The Department of State could also provide an effective deterrent 
to the institution of defamation suits through the use of its power 
to regulate real estate brokers. The Department has the power to 
revoke or suspend the license of any real estate broker· or salesman 
who has "demonstrated untrustworthiness."53 The Secretary of State 
has recently interpreted this language as including a violation of 
the Law Against Discrimination.54 On June 3, 1965, a Civil Rights 
Unit was established in the Department of State to deal exclusively 
with discriminatory violations. By September 13, 1965, thirty-two 
hearings had been completed, resulting in the suspension or revoca-
tion of twelve licenses.55 Although the unjustified use of a defamation 
suit as a means of retaliation is not now considered grounds for the 
revocation or suspension of a broker's license,58 there is no apparent 
reason why the Department of State should not furnish the com-
plainants with needed protection by regarding this means of re-
of process); Lader v. Benlmwitz, 188 Misc. 906, 66 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (bringing 
suit for disorderly conduct in order to compel defendant to pay hotel bill held an 
abuse of process). The allegation of an improper motive is not sufficient; there must be 
an actual misuse of process. See Goldstein v. Siegel, 19 App. Div. 2d 489, 244 N.Y.S.2d 
379 (1963). The mere institution of a civil suit that has caused the party trouble, incon-
venience, and expense will not support an action for abuse of process. See Miller v. 
Stem, 262 App. Div. 5, 27 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1941). 
52. In Sweeting v. Cristy Realty Co., CH-10479-64 (N.Y. Comm'n on Human Rights 
1964), the Commission incorporated such an exchange of releases in its final order. 
53. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441-c(l). 
54. Press Release From State Commission for Human Rights, Jan. 21, 1965, on file 
with Michigan Law Review. 
55. Letter From F. William Guma, Deputy Secretary of State, to Michigan Law Re• 
view, Sept. 13, 1965. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1965, § 8, p. 1, col. 8. 
56. Letter From F. William Guma, Deputy Secretary of State, to Michigan Law Re• 
view, Oct. 14, 1965. 
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taliation as a demonstration of "untrustworthiness," just as it does 
other discriminatory conduct. 
The risk and uncertainty surrounding these possible methods 
of preventing the use of unjustified defamation suits reinforces the 
argument that the Commission should conduct an investigation to 
determine whether the defamation suit is based on a bona fide 
grievance or is being employed to harass the complainant.57 Having 
examined the incident originally alleged to be discriminatory and 
having available the records of any past misconduct by either party, 
the Commission is well equipped to make a determination of the 
motivation of the defamation suit. ·The authority for the making of 
such a determination could be based upon either a broader inter-
pretation of the present statute by the Commissi~n58 or upon new 
legislation specifically granting the Commission such power. If the 
Commission did undertake such an investigation, the complainant 
could secure a stay of the court proceedings pending the outcome 
of the Commission's hearing on the alleged discriminatory retali-
ation.59 If the defamation suit were found to be justified, the Com-
mission would dismiss the retaliation complaint, and the prosecution 
of the suit could continue. Thus, the legitimate interest of the 
broker to be free from spurious accusation would not be impinged. 
If the suit were found to ·be retaliatory, the Commission could order 
the broker to cease and desist from his unlawful practice, seeking 
court enforcement of the order if the broker refused to discontinue 
the suit. Since the administrative retaliation hearing would be exclu-
sive while pending, there would be no danger that the complainant 
could launch a two-pronged attack against the broker by filing both 
a retaliation complaint with the Commission and an abuse-of-process 
action with the court. 60 
57. If the Commission conducted a hearing on the retaliation complaint, the broker 
could seek a court injunction, alleging that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. Since 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the question involved 
is a purely legal one, Public Serv. Comm'n v. Norton, 304 N.Y. 522, 109 N.E.2d 705 
(1952), or when the suit involves a challenge of the constitutionality of the statute on 
which the administrative action is based, Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. State Div. Against Dis-
crimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960), the court 
might grant the injunction. On the other hand, the court might regard the issue as a 
factual dispute within the Commission's competence and deny the injunction. School 
Dist. of Royal Oak v. State Tenure Comm'n, 367 Mich. 689, 117 N.W.2d 181 (1962); see 
Cramton, The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Michigan, 44 
Mich. S.B.J., July 1965, p. 10. However, the mere possibility that the Commission's 
jurisdiction over the retaliation complaint might be challenged in court should not 
prevent the Commission from attempting to protect the complainants. 
58. See text accompanying note 10 supra. 
59. N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAw § 2201. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. In order 
to protect the complainant from the financial burden of appearing in court before 
the Commission had determined whether the suit was justified, the Commission could 
either seek the stay on behalf of the complainant or could award the complainant 
compensatory damages if it ultimately found the suit to be unjustified. See note 13 
supra. 
60. See cases cited note 46 supra and accompanying text. 
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The continued effectiveness of these defamation suits could
greatly reduce the capacity of the fair housing laws to deal with dis-
crimination both in New York and other states having fair housing
laws.61 The public policy of ending racial discrimination is best
served by allowing those who feel themselves to be the victims of
discrimination to bring their complaints to the State Commission
for Human Rights, as was originally contemplated by the Law
Against Discrimination. This can be accomplished only if the com-
plainants are protected from the harassment of retaliatory defamation
suits. 6
2
61. The following twenty states have fair housing laws: Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin.
62. In Habib v. Edwards, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2242 (D.C. Civ. Ct. Oct. 29, 1965), the
court held that a landlord cannot evict a tenant for reporting building code violations
to the proper authorities, on the ground that the Constitution prohibits even a private
party from interfering with a citizen's right to report the violation of a federal law
to the federal government.
[V7ol. 6
